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Abstract
The role of foreign policy think tanks (FPTTs) in policy-making has received substantial
scholarly attention, with most studies focusing on US-based organizations. In this art-
icle, we seek to address this spatial bias by discussing the development and roles of
FPTTs in two East Asian countries, China and Japan. China today hosts the second-
largest think tank scene in the world, and many FPTTs have received influxes of funding
and increased the academic qualifications of their staffers in recent years. Japan also
hosts a sizable array of think tanks, but many of them operate on a for-profit basis and
do not focus on public policy issues; Japan has very few genuine FPTTs. In both coun-
tries, FPTTs are in many ways linked to the government. While they seek to inform and
influence foreign and security policy as well as public discourse on international affairs,
they usually do not act as agenda setters. By examining the recent case of constitutional
reinterpretation in Japan, which aimed to enable collective self-defence, we show how
Japanese public intellectuals, including think tankers, helped to legitimize this contro-
versial move and how Chinese FPTTs reacted publicly by providing media commentary
in support of the official government line.
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Thinks tanks are signiﬁcant political actors operating in many polities across the
globe, as well as at the trans- or supranational level. The main mission of such
organizations is to inform and/or inﬂuence public policy (and in some cases cor-
porate aﬀairs) on the basis of research and analysis provided by in-house and
aﬃliated staﬀ.1 The role of think tanks in foreign policy deliberation and deci-
sion-making processes has received substantial scholarly attention in recent dec-
ades. Many studies focus on the speciﬁc impact of foreign policy think tanks
(FPTTs) on US foreign policy, which is understandable given that Washington
has been the place where these organizations originally took root; that the US is
home to a large number of ideologically diverse, well-resourced think tanks; and
that the continuing pivotal role of the US in world aﬀairs makes it particularly
worthwhile to study the sources of input to its foreign policy.
However, as scholars comparing think tank systems internationally have noted,2
these organizations have spread to basically every world region, albeit not to the
same extent.3 The existing spatial bias in research on think thanks—FPTTs and
others—thus severely limits our understanding of such organizations as a global
phenomenon. Since East Asia is now home to the largest number of institutes
outside the Western world, more empirical work is required to better grasp the
development and particular conﬁgurations of think tanks in this region. Such
research also promises returns to the general study of think tank development
and inﬂuence because the political and economic conditions that are seen as the
bedrock of think tank vitality in the US—mainly independence from government
structures through external ﬁnancing and a free, competitive ‘‘marketplace of
ideas’’—are far less pronounced, if they exist at all, in other world regions, includ-
ing East Asia. This paper is an attempt to cast more light on the development and
roles played by FPTTs in East Asia’s most economically and politically important
countries: China and Japan.
China houses the most think tanks in the world outside of the United States.
This fact, coupled with the political rise which China has experienced as a conse-
quence of three decades of rapid economic growth, has also led to considerable
interest in the role and inﬂuence of Chinese FPTTs.4 China’s rise has been mirrored
1. Such a definition acknowledges that think tanks come in various shapes, reflecting both internal
and external factors. See Patrick Koellner, ‘‘Think tanks: The quest to define and to rank them,’’
GIGA Focus International Edition no. 10 (2013): 2–3, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/
publications/gf_international_1310.pdf (accessed 15 December 2014).
2. See James McGann and Kent Weaver, eds., Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and
Action (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, eds.,
Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2004).
3. For a recent tally of the global distribution of think tanks, see James McGann, ‘‘2014 Global Go To
Think Tank Index Report’’ (Philadelphia: Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 2015), 53.
4. China Quarterly devoted a thematic issue to think tanks in September 2002 which included contri-
butions on Chinese FPTTs. For more recent overviews see Cheng Li, ‘‘China’s new think tanks:
Where officials, entrepreneurs, and scholars interact,’’ China Leadership Monitor 29 (summer 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/08/summer-china-li (accessed 15 December 2014);
Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner, ‘‘The Impact of China’s foreign policy think tanks,’’
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by Japan’s relative decline in recent years. Once seen as on the way to becoming the
global ‘‘number one,’’ Japan has been overtaken as the world’s second-largest
economy by its big neighbour, and is now most concerned with how to react to
the challenge of a rising China. Moreover, the two countries are involved in a
territorial dispute over the small Senkaku islands (Chinese: Diaoyutai). While on
the surface this conﬂict centres on ﬁshing grounds and suspected natural resources,
it has also become a symbolically loaded issue, with China seeking to expunge
decades of humiliation at the hands of the Japanese.
China’s increasing assertiveness in the East and the South China Seas and the
country’s growing military-force projection abilities have alarmed Japan. Under its
current prime minister Shinz o Abe, Japan has pursued a more muscular security
policy: Abe has promised to strengthen the alliance with the US; courted strategic
partners in the wider Asia-Paciﬁc region, including Australia and India; increased
the defence budget; established a National Security Council; and abandoned a
decades-long ban on the export of weapon technologies. Overall, he has sought
to make Japan a more ‘‘normal country’’ in terms of its defence and security
proﬁle.5 In China, these moves have been met with intense suspicion, as they are
thought to be aimed at containing China and thwarting its ambitions at regional
leadership.6
To illustrate some of the roles played by think tanks in Japan’s and China’s
foreign policy deliberation and decision-making processes, we focus in this article
on one important development in Japan’s recent security policy: the Japanese
Cabinet’s July 2014 decision to reinterpret the constitution to allow for collective
self-defence, and the reactions by Chinese think tanks to this move. Accordingly,
we not only aim to show how the FPTT sectors in Japan and China compare with
each other in institutional terms but also to highlight the potential and limits of
think tank involvement in foreign and security policy in both countries. Finally, we
aim to contribute to a better understanding of how think tanks operate in non-
Western societies.
The article is structured as follows: The next section provides an overview of
Japan’s FPTT landscape. Here, we also sketch the process leading to the 2014
reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution and the role of external policy
advice therein. We then provide a similar overview of the Chinese system and
the ways in which think tanks contribute to that nation’s policy-making. Since
China played no active role in the Japanese reinterpretation itself, but was very
much alarmed by it, we focus in this section on public reactions by China’s think
tanks and how they relate to the central government’s response. The last section
BICCS Asia Paper 5, no. 5, http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/Asia%20papers/
20100405%20-%20Bondiguel%20Kellner.pdf (accessed 15 December 2014).
5. See Sheila Smith, Japan’s New Politics and the US-Japan Alliance (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 2014).
6. See Amy King, ‘‘Where does Japan fit in China’s new type of great power relations?’’ The Asan
Forum, 20 March 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/where-does-japan-fit-in-chinas-new-type-of-
great-power-relations/ (accessed 7 December 2014).
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highlights some of the similarities and diﬀerences between the FPTT sectors in
these countries and addresses their role in managing Sino-Japanese relations.
Foreign policy think tanks in Japan
Overview
Both foreign and domestic observers have bemoaned the lack of a vibrant think
tank scene in Japan. They point to a lack of independence among think tanks,
inadequate staﬃng, unstable ﬁnancial resources, and a perceived inability of think
tanks to have an impact on public policy.7 Such assessments stand in stark contrast
to the sizable array of think tanks that do exist in Japan. A recent survey puts their
overall number at close to 230, which nonetheless represents a signiﬁcant decrease
since the start of the new millennium, when over 330 were counted.8 It seems, then,
that Japan’s stagnating economy during the past two decades has also taken a
heavy toll on domestic think tanks.
Rather than focusing on inﬂuencing public policy, close to half of the existing
think tanks in Japan operate as for-proﬁt organizations, often as aﬃliates of large
corporations, including ﬁnancial institutions. The apparent lack of a public policy
orientation on the part of most Japanese think tanks can be explained by a number
of demand and supply factors. Just about every think tank publication in Japan
emphasizes the traditional role of the national bureaucracy, clustered in Tokyo’s
government district, Kasumigaseki, in terms of shaping public policies. And virtu-
ally every policymaker and think tanker interviewed by one of the authors noted in
a mantra-like fashion that ‘‘Kasumigaseki is Japan’s biggest think tank.’’
For decades, Japan’s elite bureaucracy has attracted some of the best and bright-
est university graduates. Admittedly, the reputation of the bureaucracy has dete-
riorated since the latter half of the 1990s, and the heyday of Japan’s
‘‘developmental state’’ has passed. Still, Japan’s national bureaucracy continues
to be perceived by domestic actors as a powerful policy agent. With respect to
external input into public policy, the public service has traditionally relied on
ministerial advisory or policy deliberation councils, whose members could be
hand-picked and whose operations could be steered by the executive. In sum,
Japan’s elite bureaucrats have rarely sought out genuine policy alternatives from
think tanks and other policy research institutions. The same has generally been true
for their long-time principals within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
with whom the bureaucracy has historically enjoyed a symbiotic relationship.
7. See, for example, Raymond J. Struyk, Makiko Ueno, and Takahiro Suzuki, A Japanese Think
Tank: Exploring Alternative Models (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1993), xiii, 3; Ayako
Mie, ‘‘Japan urged to embrace U.S.-style think tanks,’’ Japan Times, 10 January 2014, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/10/national/japan-urged-to-embrace-u-s-style-think-tanks/
(accessed 24 April 2014).
8. S og o kenky u kaihatsu kik o (NIRA), ‘‘‘Shinku tanku j oh o 2013’ no ch osa kekka no gaiy o’’ (Tokyo:
NIRA), July 2013: 2.
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On the supply side, unlike the situation in the US and some other countries,
there is no tradition of philanthropy in Japan, and think tanks cannot count on
generous ﬁnancial support from donors. Until recently, only a small share of dona-
tions has been tax-deductible. Most think tanks thus remain dependent on funding
for research projects commissioned by corporations or by the state. Those that do
not receive institutional support from companies, ministries, or local governments
have to cope with unstable funding, which constrains their ability to employ high-
calibre researchers. The general attractiveness of a career in the think tank sector is
also limited by the absence of a revolving door linking think tanks and the gov-
ernment. For one, the seniority principle prevailing in most Japanese organizations
prevents such exchanges. Moreover, the number of political appointments in the
bureaucracy tends to be low, and openness to lateral entry is limited. Overall,
Japan thus provides a fairly inhospitable terrain for public policy-oriented think
tanks.
The strong business focus of many Japanese think tanks can be gleaned from
their most important areas of research: economic issues, land development, wel-
fare, environmental aﬀairs, and industry. According to a series of surveys, among
all research activities carried out by Japanese think tanks between 1993 and 2011,
the share of projects on international aﬀairs hovered at around ﬁve percent.9 In
2012, only eight institutes surveyed considered international aﬀairs their most
important area of research. The few existing FPTTs in Japan can be grouped,
following Diane Stone’s useful typology, into government, civil society, and busi-
ness-aﬃliated organizations.10 Two other types mentioned by Stone, political
party-aﬃliated and university-aﬃliated think tanks, have been less important. In
terms of party think tanks, both the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
founded their own think tanks after 2005. However, the two organizations proved
short-lived, understaﬀed, and poorly integrated into the parties’ policy-making
apparatuses. Notably, they also did not focus on foreign aﬀairs.
University-aﬃliated think tanks focusing on international aﬀairs do exist at a
few universities such as Takushoku and Ritsumeikan. A recent addition has been
Meiji University’s Institute for Global Aﬀairs, established in 2011 as part of the
university’s internationalization drive. Some well-known foreign aﬀairs specialists,
including former practitioners, are based at these institutes. However, their involve-
ment in government advisory bodies tends to be more sporadic and their outreach
activities more limited than in the case of the FPTTs discussed below. The insti-
tution to watch may be the well-resourced National Graduate Institute for Policy
Studies (GRIPS), a public policy-focused postgraduate training institution with
many well-known professors on staﬀ. GRIPS has in recent years sought to
assume some think tank functions.
9. NIRA, ‘‘‘Shinku tanku j oh o 2013,’’’ 4, 8, and earlier editions.
10. Diane Stone, ‘‘Think tanks and policy advice in countries in transition,’’ in Toru Hashimoto,
Stefan Hell, and Sang-Woo Nam, eds., Public Policy Research and Training in Vietnam (Tokyo:
Asia Development Institute, 2005), 48.
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Government-aﬃliated or state-sponsored FPTTs include the National Institute
for Defense Studies (NIDS), whose predecessor was set up in 1952. The NIDS is a
formal government agency aﬃliated with the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Its main
missions are to train military and other executive personnel, to organize inter-
national exchanges with similar organizations in Asia and beyond, to conduct
commissioned research on Japan’s military history, and to undertake policy-
relevant research on current security aﬀairs. The NIDS includes approximately
85 research fellows. It publishes monthly brieﬁng papers; its senior researchers
provide brieﬁngs to the policy-planning staﬀ of the MOD; and, once per year, it
briefs the defence minister and the prime minister. Internationally, the NIDS might
be best known for its yearbook, East Asian Strategic Review.11
The Japan Institute for International Aﬀairs (JIIA) has played a related role for
the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MOFA). Set up in 1959 by the former prime
minister Shigeru Yoshida, it was modelled on Chatham House and the Council
on Foreign Relations. Until recently, it received core institutional funding from the
ministry, with corporate and individual membership dues serving as a secondary
income source. It has never been a formal part of MOFA. Close links between the
institute and the ministry are nonetheless maintained, not least through staﬀ sec-
ondments and the institute’s heading by former MOFA oﬃcials. During the Cold
War, one major focus of the JIIA was the Soviet Union.12 Thereafter, as in the case
of most other Japanese FPTTs, attention increasingly shifted to China. Notably,
the JIIA never boasted a signiﬁcant cadre of experienced, public policy-oriented
researchers. Rather, the institute concentrated on publishing foreign aﬀairs jour-
nals and serving as an exchange platform with international policymakers and
scholars; basically, it performed roles that the ministry’s public servants could or
would not play themselves.
Similar platform or ‘‘salon’’ functions13 have also been served by a number of
civil society-based FPTTs such as the Japan Center for International Exchange
(JCIE). The JCIE was established in 1970—the beginning of the ﬁrst think tank
boom in Japan14—and over the years successfully ran a number of dialogue forums
with individual foreign countries. In particular, the JCIE was instrumental in estab-
lishing pipelines to US policymakers and their staﬀ. Another small FPTT, the
Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), was founded in 1978 by a
11. Available online at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian (accessed 12 December
2014).
12. See Toshihiro Nakayama, ‘‘How to enliven Japan’s foreign policy think tanks,’’ Nippon.com,
7 September 2012, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00049/ (accessed 1 November 2013).
13. On these and other FPTT functions, see Patrick Koellner, ‘‘Think tanks: Their development,
global diversity and roles in international affairs,’’ GIGA Focus International Edition no. 6
(2011): 5–6, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_international_1106.pdf
(accessed 15 December 2014).
14. Many think tanks founded during the first and the second boom phases, that is, around 1970 and
in the late 1980s, were established by big, internationally expanding conglomerates and financial
institutions such as Nomura, Mitsubishi, Daiwa, and Fujitsu. For a discussion of the various
phases in Japanese think tank development, see Takahiro Suzuki, Nihon ni ‘‘minshushugi’’
o kigyou suru (Tokyo: Daiichi shinsho, 2007), 130–138.
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former president of the National Defense Academy, with encouragement from the
Defense Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, and Keidanren, a business fed-
eration. RIPS’ most important legacy has been a scholarship program for young
Japanese researchers, established in the late 1980s with government support.
Around 100 young scholars have beneﬁted from this program, including many
who have since become university professors and have helped to create and nurture
a security studies community in Japanese academia and beyond.
Two other civil society-based FPTTs are the Institute for International Policy
Studies (IIPS) and the Tokyo Foundation (TF). Both organizations are particu-
larly sound ﬁnancially. The IIPS, funded by income derived from a USD$50 mil-
lion endowment in addition to annual corporate membership fees, was established
in 1988 by the former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, in response to what he
saw as a problem of stove piping inside the Japanese bureaucracy. Accordingly,
one of the main missions of the IIPS—apart from publishing journals; conducting
research with its limited pool of in-house researchers; and having like-minded
academics produce policy reports on foreign and security policy, education
reform, and constitutional change—has been to establish cross-organizational
links. It has done so by bringing mid-level employees from ministries and large
corporations to the institute for periods of 2 years, during which they are supposed
to engage in research and create bonds among themselves. So far, over 10 such
cohorts have stayed at the institute.
The TF was established as an operative foundation in 1997. As in the case of its
sister organization, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a charitable organization
which also runs people-to-people exchange programs, the TF derives its income
from the Nippon Foundation (not to be confused with the government-funded
Japan Foundation). While the TF’s leadership exhibits a clear conservative ﬂavour,
the same cannot be said of all of its senior program oﬃcers, some of whom spent a
formative period in Washington-based think tanks. The TF runs foreign policy-
related dialogue forums and publishes reports and policy briefs by in-house and
aﬃliated researchers.
Foreign policy think tanks with close ties to the business world include the
Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), established in 1987 amid rising
trade tensions centring on Japan, by the former foreign minister Sabur o Okita,
the corporate magnate Ichir o Hattori (who also contributed the then equivalent
of USD$1.4 million to the institute’s endowment), and the diplomat-turned-aca-
demic Ken’ichi It o. Over the years, the JFIR—a fairly slim organization funded
mainly by membership fees as well as conference or project grants—has orga-
nized a number of bilateral and multilateral dialogue forums and has also pro-
duced, in cooperation with university-based academics, extensive policy
papers. Just like the JIIA, the JFIR has served as one of Japan’s windows to
the world.
The only corporation-linked think tank that focuses substantively on foreign
aﬀairs is the Canon Institute for Global Studies, which was established in 2007 by
the Canon Corporation. Given its limited personnel—only a handful of researchers
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work on international aﬀairs—foreign policy-relevant research focuses on
Northeast Asia and the US. The institute is also involved in nurturing next-genera-
tion international aﬀairs specialists and government oﬃcials, for example, by run-
ning simulation and role-playing exercises. Some senior institute staﬀers, such as
Kunihiko Miyake, a former high-ranking MOFA oﬃcial with strong neo-realist
views and an advocate of a more muscular Japanese defence and security policy,
are also fairly active as media commentators, thus contributing to the public dis-
course on foreign policy and international aﬀairs.
Recent developments
Developments in recent years have aﬀected Japanese FPTTs in diﬀerent, somewhat
ambivalent ways. Popular interest in foreign and security aﬀairs has clearly
increased, especially in view of the challenges posed by China’s rise, growing
threat perceptions vis-a`-vis North Korea, and mounting tensions in the East and
South China Seas. Some media-savvy think tank staﬀers have thus beneﬁted from
increased demands for their services and have, consequently, also gained opportu-
nities to make their opinions heard in the contemporary public discourse on
Japanese foreign and security policy. However, demand for genuine policy input
from FPTTs has not substantially increased in recent years according to the pol-
iticians and thank tankers interviewed. Apparently, the DPJ’s eventual coming to
power in 2009 and its three years in government also did not lead to greater
demand for foreign policy input from such organizations.
On the supply side, a law passed in June 2011 making it easier for non-proﬁt
organizations (including some think tanks) to qualify for favourable tax status has
apparently not led to a signiﬁcant increase in donations—which is perhaps not
surprising given Japan’s diﬃcult economic situation. One well-known think tank,
the JIIA, even faced a grave ﬁnancial challenge when the new DPJ-led government
decided, as a result of a new budget-screening process,15 to phase out its institu-
tional funding. What particularly irked the DPJ were the close links between the
JIIA and the MOFA, including the tradition of having ‘‘old boys’’ from the min-
istry head the institute. Institutional funding for the JIIA was eﬀectively phased out
in 2013.
On the other hand, more project-based funding has become available on a com-
petitive basis from the MOFA in recent years. In particular, experienced think
tanks like the JIIA, the JFIR, and recently also the IIPS, have beneﬁted. Such
funding, useful as it is for the successful applicants, does little to alleviate the
chronic underﬁnancing and understaﬃng of most Japanese FPTTs. According to
an advisory group report presented to the then foreign minister, K oichir o Gemba,
in August 2012, the budgets of the top ﬁve FPTTs in Japan had shrunk by
40 percent between 1998 und 2008, while the budget of the top ﬁve US institutes
15. Incidentally, the DPJ based this weeding out of ‘‘unnecessary’’ public expenses on recommenda-
tions by a domestic think tank that had examined Canadian experiences with budget screening.
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grew by 150 percent over the same period. The same group also recommended the
establishment of a new FPTT to make Japan’s voice better heard on the inter-
national stage.16 While the current LDP-led government is unlikely to heed this
call, it may well be more forthcoming in terms of supplying the JIIA and other
think tanks with additional funds in the future. Such support would be based,
among other things, on the government’s National Security Strategy, published
in December 2013, which stipulates that ‘‘Japan will promote practical research on
national security, and engage in deepening exchanges among the government,
higher education institutions and think tanks, thereby promoting the sharing of
insight and knowledge.’’17
Other noteworthy recent developments in Japan’s FPTT scene include the
eﬀorts of some venerable organizations to manage generational change at their
helm, and the arrival of a new publicity-oriented think tank, the Rebuild Japan
Initiative Foundation (RJIF), founded with business support from the well-known
liberal journalist Y o’ichi Funabashi.18 Last but not least, the establishment of
Japan’s National Security Council in early 2014, endowed with a 70 staﬀer-
strong secretariat, will provide opportunities for at least a few think tankers to
serve some time in the executive. Still, given the overall ambivalent picture sur-
rounding Japanese FPTTs, it seems premature to herald the ‘‘emergence of a vital
[FPTT] community in Japan.’’19
Reinterpreting the constitution
When Shinz o Abe ﬁrst served as prime minister for 12 months in 2006–2007—he
resigned after a lost Upper House election, while also citing health reasons—he
convened an ‘‘Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security.’’
This panel was to deliberate legal issues aﬀecting Japan’s ability to actively con-
tribute to peace and stability in Asia and beyond. At the core of the panel’s dis-
cussions was the right of collective self-defence, which is permitted under the
charter of the United Nations but not, according to standard interpretations,
under the Japanese Constitution. In its famous Article 9, the constitution
renounces Japan’s sovereign right to wage war and to maintain armed forces for
that purpose. Japan’s military, which was (re-)established in the wake of the
Korean War, has thus been supposed to defend Japan only. Japan therefore has
not been able to support its alliance partner, the United States, militarily outside
16. The advisory report is available online at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/24/8/pdfs/
0807_06_02.pdf (accessed 9 February 2015). See also Nakayama, ‘‘How to enliven.’’
17. The National Security Strategy is available online at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/
131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014). The quotation is from pages 36
and 37.
18. Recent RJIF activities include the publication of a thoughtful report on US–Japan strategic
cooperation and the establishment of a dialogue forum for former high-ranking military officials
from the two countries. See http://rebuildjpn.org/en/project/ (accessed 11 December 2014).
19. Sebastian Maslow, ‘‘Thinking security: Foreign policy think tanks in Japan,’’ Asian Politics &
Policy 5, no. 2 (2013): 304.
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Japan. Subsequent reinterpretations of the constitution have, however, allowed for
Japan’s limited participation in international peacekeeping operations (PKOs).
Article 9 has always been a thorn in the side of conservative Japanese politicians,
including prime ministers Nakasone and Abe, who wish to make Japan a ‘‘normal
country’’ in terms of its security and defence proﬁle. The advisory panel established in
April 2007, consistingofhand-pickedmembers, hadnotarrivedat aﬁnal reportby the
timeAberesigned.His successor,YasuoFukuda,didnotprioritize securityaﬀairsand
chose not to act on the recommendations contained in the panel’s June 2008 report.
Yet, after Abe regained power in late 2012, he reconstituted the advisory council
‘‘in light of the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan,’’20
with the participation of some think tankers. The 13-member council included a
professor from GRIPS, a diplomat-turned-head-of-think tank, and the president of
the IIPS. The reconstituted panel was eﬀectively steered by Shin’ichi Kitaoka, one
of the few Japanese academics who has successfully straddled the spheres of aca-
demia, think tanks, and government, being a renowned historian, a professor at
Tokyo University (and now at GRIPS), a director of research at the IIPS, an
adjunct research fellow at the TF, and a former extraordinary ambassador to the
UN, as well as a veteran of many governmental advisory boards on foreign and
security aﬀairs and bilateral dialogue forums.
Apparently, the government found the ﬁnal report, submitted by the advisory
group in May 2014, somewhat heavy going in terms of legalistic jargon and, much
to the dismay of some of the core panel members, it also considered a few of the
recommendations politically unfeasible—most notably the call for a substantial
revision of the PKO law to enable Japan’s participation in ‘‘robust’’ PKOs. The
government nevertheless seized on some of the report’s core statements, including
those making the case for a reinterpretation of the constitution. The report argued
that Article 9 eﬀectively permits collective self-defence as long as ‘‘(1) there is an
imminent unlawful infringement against Japan, (2) there is no other appropriate
means available to repel this infringement; and (3) the use of force is limited to the
minimum extent necessary.’’21
The report, crafted by a group of like-minded public intellectuals, eﬀectively
helped legitimize the LDP and its coalition partner K omeit o’s subsequent reinter-
pretation of the constitution. In July 2014, the Cabinet declared that collective self-
defence was permissible if there was an armed attack ‘‘against a foreign country
that is in a close relationship with Japan’’ and if that attack also posed a ‘‘clear
danger’’ to Japan’s own security.22 The new interpretation is now being translated
into various bills, including a revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
20. ‘‘Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,’’ 15 May 2014,
53, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf (accessed 12 December
2014).
21. ‘‘Report of the Advisory Panel,’’ 29.
22. ‘‘Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival
and Protect Its People,’’ 1 July 2014, 8, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/__icsFiles/
afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpohosei_eng.pdf (accessed 12 December 2014).
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This case of constitutional reinterpretation highlights the possibilities as well as
the limits of think tank engagement in Japanese foreign and security policy.
Following established practice, the government chose to set up an expert panel
rather than pursue think tank input directly. The panel consisted of hand-picked,
like-minded members, and did not aim for bipartisanship. The think tankers who
took part were mostly conservative public intellectuals, either well-known aca-
demics in their own right or distinguished, former high-ranking oﬃcials.
Arguably, the homogeneous composition of the advisory panel made the group
more eﬀective in producing a fairly coherent report that was ultimately useful to
the government.
On a broader level the case examined suggests that, given the right external and
internal circumstances, including political leaders committed to policy change, and
cohesion among the group members, external advisory policy boards can help
facilitate the deliberation and formulation of foreign and security policy in
Japan. Especially in political contexts in which various ministries and related inter-
est groups pursue their speciﬁc agendas and interests, that is, where problems of
‘‘sectionalism’’ and ‘‘stovepiping’’ exist, such boards involving think tankers and
other public intellectuals without clear vested interests may help political leaders to
set government direction, bridging organizational divides in the process.
Foreign policy think tanks in China
Overview
China boasts a vast and diverse landscape of FPTTs which has attracted consid-
erable scholarly attention in recent years.23 Most authors focus on the question of
policy inﬂuence, which is readily explained by China’s rapidly growing importance
in international politics. However, many of the best known think tanks in China
predate the country’s rise by decades, having been established in the 1950s and
1960s based on Soviet models. Relatively little is known about the way in which
they operated in these early years, but the monopolization of foreign policy-making
by a tiny clique of top leaders renders it doubtful whether they had any genuine
impact. During the Cultural Revolution, think tanks across China mostly shared
the fate of universities, with the institutes being closed down and many of the
experts exiled to the countryside.
The resurgence of the think tank sector has been closely tied to the adoption of
reform policy in the late 1970s. China’s long-time leader Deng Xiaoping himself
valued technocratic advice to improve policy outcomes, and personally
23. In addition to the literature cited above, see Bonnie Glaser, ‘‘Chinese foreign policy research
institutes and the practice of influence,’’ and Zhao Quansheng, ‘‘The limited impact of think
tanks on policy making in China,’’ both in Gil Rozman, ed., China’s Foreign Policy: Who
Makes It, and How Is It Made? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). See also Xuanli Liao,
Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan (Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press, 2006) for a specific focus on the role of FPTTs in Sino-Japanese relations.
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spearheaded the initiative to establish a massive new top-level think tank in the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which also features an extensive
international studies research program.24 Most of the other ‘‘ﬁrst wave’’ FPTTs
were revived in a similar manner in the 1970s and 1980s, and joined by newly
established institutes as almost every state agency involved in foreign policy
sought to build its own reservoir of expertise. Today, China is home to what is
thought to be the world’s second-largest think tank sector,25 and the ﬁeld of inter-
national studies features prominently in it.
It would be impossible to name all of the respective institutes here, so we will
instead focus on distinct organizational groups and name a few of the most prom-
inent examples for each, again applying Diane Stone’s typology. Among Chinese
FPTTs, government, university, and party-aﬃliated institutes make up practically
the entire ﬁeld. Since the state and the ruling Communist Party are tightly fused,
and universities are also subjected to political control, all of these subgroups share
a major feature insofar as they are attached to the state/party power nexus, albeit in
diﬀerent ways and to varying degrees.
The biggest and, by some accounts, most inﬂuential institutes in the ﬁeld are
attached to speciﬁc state agencies and organs. The aforementioned CASS is
China’s highest-level think tank, as its direct attachment to the State Council
means that it is of ministerial rank. Various ministries engaged in foreign policy
also maintain their own institutes, such as the China Institute of International
Studies (CIIS) under the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, the China Institute for
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) under the Ministry of State
Security, and the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic
Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce.
The same is also true for many local governments, particularly those whose
regions are heavily dependent on international trade. Shanghai features the largest
foreign policy research establishment outside of Beijing, with the Shanghai
Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) often being singled out for its inter-
national network and academic avant-gardism. This proliferation of think tanks
is mainly due to the prevalent phenomenon of stovepiping in China’s policy appar-
atus, whereby subordinate units will communicate their ﬁndings to their superiors
but not share them with their peers. Although horizontal communication has
increased, agencies are still intent on maintaining exclusive access to their own
think tanks and their output.26
Next are university research departments in the ﬁelds of international relations
(IR) or area studies, which often perform think tank services as a result of explicit
directions by the leadership. Experts from the nation’s top universities, like Beida,
Renmin, and Qinghua, are regularly invited to provide lectures for the Politburo,
and famous individual scholars like Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong are known for
24. See Merle Goldman, China’s Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980), 217–220.
25. McGann, ‘‘2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report,’’ 54.
26. Glaser, ‘‘Chinese foreign policy research institutes.’’
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their ability to drive debates about China’s role in the world from the academic
sector.27 The aforementioned universities all boast large IR research establishments
like the School for International Studies at Beijing University, but some smaller
centres focusing on especially important issues—like the Center for American
Studies at Fudan University—have also performed think tank functions.
Beyond state structures, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also maintains its
own research institutions, with most of the foreign policy-related programs clus-
tered in the Institute for International Strategic Studies of the Central Party
School. Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army has built up a research program
focusing on strategic studies and security policy, drawing on its educational facil-
ities like National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences.28
Finally, the other two of Stone’s groups—private civil society think tanks and
corporate or business-aﬃliated institutes—are practically absent from China’s
FPTT landscape, owing to a political desire to monopolize these crucial intellectual
resources, general restrictions on the activity of non-governmental organizationss,
and the struggle to compete with the vast state-run think tank sector. In the ﬁeld of
economics, private initiatives have resulted in the establishment of the Tianze
(Unirule) Institute, the Boyuan Foundation, and the Dajun Center, but so far no
equivalent civil society-based foreign policy think tank exists. There are some
intermediary cases—one prominent new organization focusing on public
diplomacy, the Charhar Society, has played up its status as a ‘‘non-governmental’’
think tank, presumably in order to add credibility to its message. However,
institutes like this one are not genuinely independent, but mostly the
result of joint initiatives between the state and intellectuals, with both working in
tandem to achieve a mutual goal, in this case, improving China’s international
image.29
Accordingly, state control of the foreign policy think tank sector is not just a
relic of China’s socialist past but an enduring feature that reﬂects the will of suc-
cessive leadership generations, most recently reaﬃrmed by China’s president
Xi Jinping. Acknowledging their role in ‘‘scientiﬁc and democratic decision-
making, modernizing China’s governing system, and strengthening Chinese soft
power,’’ and promising further support for their development, Xi also stressed in
late 2014 that they would continue to be led by the CCP and had to adhere to its
political guiding function.30
The CCP’s central committee elaborated on the same themes in a January 2015
statement on ‘‘New types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics,’’ which
underscored how important policy input by think tanks and experts has become
27. Alastair Johnston, ‘‘The State of International Relations Research in China: Considerations for
the Ford Foundation’’ (Beijing: Ford Foundation, 2003).
28. Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, ‘‘Chinese military-related think tanks and research institutions,’’
The China Quarterly 171 (2002): 617–624.
29. Pascal Abb, ‘‘China’s foreign policy think tanks: Institutional evolution and changing roles,’’
Journal of Contemporary China 24 (2015): 93.
30. ‘‘Xi calls for new type of think tanks,’’ People’s Daily, 27 October 2014, http://en.people.cn/n/
2014/1027/c90785-8800606.html (accessed 8 December 2014).
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to China’s governance system.31 The document envisions a vibrant think tank
sector as a way of bringing emerging issues to the attention of decision makers
and presenting a range of possible solutions, thereby improving government
responsiveness, eﬀectiveness, and legitimacy without risking extensive public
debates that could ultimately challenge the CCP’s authority. Another key aim is
to develop a small number of institutes into ‘‘high-end’’ think tanks with the inter-
national status and ability to inﬂuence global policy debates. Foreign policy think
tanks are especially well suited to and valuable for this task because of their inher-
ent international orientation, and will likely remain a key component of Beijing’s
external communication eﬀorts.
Recent developments
When it comes to institutional development, the strong reliance of Chinese think
tanks on the state sector and their increasing, multidimensional relevance for the
system has allowed them to share the beneﬁts of China’s rise. As the demand for
their services has grown, so have the resources—ﬁnancial and otherwise—with
which they are endowed. Consider, for example, the background of employees at
major institutes: virtually every researcher now holds a PhD or is in the process of
obtaining one, and many have obtained advanced degrees from Western or
Japanese universities. This environment represents a signiﬁcant shift compared
with the 1980s and early 1990s, when think tanks were still predominantly staﬀed
by practitioners, and particularly by former oﬃcials from the foreign ministry. This
sea change has also reached the senior leadership of many institutes, where career
academics have gradually been taking over.
Besides their ability to pay competitive salaries for highly educated staﬀ, the
increasing budget of China’s FPTTs is also apparent from other perks. Institutes
such as CIIS and SIIS now reside in modern, purpose-built facilities that would not
seem out of place on Massachusetts Avenue. On the other hand, many CASS
institutes continue to languish in cramped quarters, which is arguably indicative
of a loss in status and continuing neglect by Chinese authorities.32 Regular foreign
travel, which used to be restricted to senior personnel due to its high cost, is now
the norm for most employees, and travel grants are also issued to foreign specialists
who wish to participate in conferences organized in China. These provisions have
led to a boom in international networking and have increased the ability of Chinese
FPTTs to monitor and even inﬂuence debates in major partner countries, to
31. General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, ‘‘Opinion concerning strengthening the
construction of new types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics,’’ Xinhua Online, 21
January 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2015-01/21/c_133934292.htm (accessed 19 June
2015). An English-language translation of the document is available online at https://chinacopyr-
ightandmedia.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/ccp-general-office-and-state-council-general-office-opi-
nions-concerning-strengthening-the-construction-of-new-types-of-think-tanks-with-chinese-char-
acteristics/ (accessed 17 February 2015).
32. Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, ‘‘Regulating intellectual life in China: The case of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences,’’ The China Quarterly 189 (2007): 83–99.
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communicate Chinese views of the international environment to policy elites
abroad, and to tune into the latest research trends. The 2015 statement on
‘‘think tanks with Chinese characteristics’’ similarly encourages think tanks to
strengthen international exchanges and even import foreign talent. Leadership
messaging on this subject has been mixed, however, as in 2014, CASS was admon-
ished for being ‘‘inﬁltrated by foreign forces’’ and having ‘‘ideological problems.’’33
Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen whether the oﬃcial status and
government control of Chinese FPTTs will ultimately be a bane or boon in their
quest for greater international inﬂuence.
Many of these institutes have also put the newly available resources to good use
in boosting their output, both in the ﬁelds of academia and, more recently, in
commentaries in Chinese newspapers and online media.34 This outcome is espe-
cially relevant, since it represents both a shift from their earlier role of providing
internal policy advice while maintaining a low public proﬁle, as well as making it
much easier for outsiders to trace Chinese policy debates. Public expert statements
often fulﬁll a speciﬁc political purpose and can therefore not be assumed to be
completely in line with advice provided behind the scenes (see also below). Notably,
Chinese leaders have explicitly included ‘‘public opinion guidance’’ and ‘‘dissemi-
nating mainstream ideology and guidance’’ as key tasks of think tanks in their
directives.35 However, judging from many personal conversations with Chinese
experts, they are usually very frank and straightforward, and their writings reﬂect
genuine beliefs rather than just the state’s propagandistic needs. While messages are
government inﬂuenced and of course subject to China’s general censorship regime,
they should be understood as indicative of a consensus between oﬃcials and
experts, rather than as evidence of the use of the latter as mere mouthpieces.
Apart from their public writings, Chinese think tanks also still submit reports on
current events to their administrative superiors via internal communication chan-
nels. Since this process is opaque not only to outside observers but also to most
researchers themselves, the policy impact of individual pieces is hard to gauge,
except for rare cases where high-level decision makers personally recommend spe-
ciﬁc reports.36 Most experts, however, agree that the sheer quantity of information
to which the leadership is exposed has inﬂuenced the practice of Chinese foreign
policy.37 For one, the redundancy brought about by stovepiping has beneﬁts in that
many experts from institutes with distinct outlooks will weigh in on an issue,
33. Adrian Wan, ‘‘Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is ‘infiltrated by foreign forces’: Anti-graft
official,’’ South China Morning Post, 15 June 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/
1533020/chinese-academy-social-sciences-infiltrated-foreign-forces-anti-graft (accessed 19 May
2015).
34. For example, the total journal-article output of 11 prominent Chinese FPTTs rose by about 70
percent between 2002 and 2012, while their appearances in newspapers increased almost tenfold.
Abb, ‘‘China’s foreign policy think tanks.’’
35. General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, ‘‘Opinion concerning think tanks.’’
36. Glaser, ‘‘Chinese foreign policy research institutes.’’
37. David Shambaugh, ‘‘China’s international relations think tanks: evolving structure and process,’’
The China Quarterly 171(2002): 575–596; Li, ‘‘China’s new think tanks.’’
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presenting additional policy options and thereby creating more diverse debates.
Second, Chinese leaders have increasingly found it necessary to develop policy
positions on emerging issues since, in the contemporary world, China will often
be put on the spot to take a national position (the 2009 Copenhagen climate
summit serves as a case in point). On these questions, there are few political preju-
dices, and experts who have conducted cutting-edge research will have more oppor-
tunities to shape a debate right from the beginning. Third, academic expertise and
credibility have become a crucial resource in Chinese policy debates, similar to the
role that experts already play in the Western ‘‘marketplaces of ideas.’’
Distinguished scholars based at think tanks or universities have found it much
easier to attract attention to their views, and a select few have even been given
personal access to oﬃcials as a result.
Chinese think tank reactions to Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation
Given the current tense relationship between China and Japan and the increasing
relevance of security issues to regional politics, it is not surprising that the Japanese
government’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution had repercussions
abroad. Abe’s announcement drew an immediate and sharp rebuke from China’s
foreign ministry, which accused the Japanese government of ‘‘stirring up trouble in
both the ﬁelds of history and security policy,’’ and wondered whether Japan had
‘‘left the path of peaceful development and sought to overturn the postwar
order.’’38 China’s think tanks also did not waste any time in reacting to this new
development. Throughout July 2014, the pages of newspapers were ﬁlled with
dozens of commentaries from all of the major institutes, eager to get their own
analysis of its eﬀects out. From these, we selected a sample of 10 documents,
covering the voices of several diﬀerent authors from each of the four biggest
Chinese FPTTs – CASS, CICIR, CIIS, and SIIS.
When comparing these documents with each other and with China’s oﬃcial
stance on the issue summarized above, it is immediately apparent that they strongly
resemble one another in content and tone: not only do they uniformly condemn the
move, but they also stress precisely the same points as the ministry. For example,
all but two connect the issue to Abe’s provocative handling of history and warn of
a resurgent Japanese militarism. All but one of the authors also conclude that this
new policy will raise regional tensions and ultimately undermine Japan’s own
development, echoing the foreign ministry spokesperson’s remarks verbatim.
Another common argument found in both the oﬃcial response and most commen-
taries is that Japan is playing up the so-called ‘‘China threat’’ theory as a justiﬁ-
cation for its policy change, and is in fact pursuing an encirclement policy toward
China.39 Finally, many authors also addressed the domestic political angle of the
38. ‘‘Remarks by MOFA spokesperson Hong Lei,’’ 1 July 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/
fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1170302.shtml (accessed 8 December 2014).
39. See Liu Junhong, ‘‘anbei qiangtui jiti ziweiquan yizai hewei zhongguo,’’ Ziguangge, 15 August
2014, http://zggzz.zgg.gov.cn/zxyq/201408/rcyzhsh/GHJHJ/201408/t20140815_463490.html
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reinterpretation, pointing out that this manoeuvre had sidelined the Japanese par-
liament and faced signiﬁcant opposition from Japanese intellectuals, newspapers,
and ordinary citizens, the latter of which took to the streets in protest.
It is clear that the public activity of China’s FPTTs was tightly constrained by
the oﬃcial response, and mostly took the form of expounding and elaborating on
it. The think tanks provided background information about the policy’s immediate
eﬀects, the complex workings of regional alliance mechanisms, and the role of the
US in eﬀecting the change. Absent, however, were policy suggestions on how the
Chinese side should react to these developments, which are usually a staple of
Western think tank commentaries.
The second major issue addressed by think tank commentators concerned the
intentions behind the shift, focusing speciﬁcally on the motivations of Abe and
the LDP’s conservative wing. Again, they were unanimous in identifying the root
cause in Japan’s eclipse by a rising China, a trend which ‘‘rightists’’ or ‘‘hawks’’
sought to both exploit and ultimately reverse by unlocking the country’s potential
as a military power in a bid to re-establish regional leadership.40 Chinese experts
were also careful to point out diﬀerences between Abe’s policies and the majority
views of Japanese citizens, which they praised as holding on to Japan’s postwar
paciﬁst traditions.41 These messages were not only intended to portray the
Cabinet decision as illegitimate but also calibrated to discourage a demonization
of Japan as a state, which has in recent years been a frequent target of nationalist
writings and protests in China. In identifying Abe and his circle as the lone
culprits, they provided the government yet another service in deﬂecting popu-
lar pressure for a hardline response and stressing the desirability of a future
return to cooperation, which is also of crucial importance to China’s own
development.
While this example is instructive for the work of China’s FPTTs, there are
some special circumstances that need to be taken into account when generalizing
from it. First, Sino-Japanese relations, and especially their historical dimension, is
a highly politically sensitive issue in China, and related debates will always be
tightly controlled and scripted. Even in the absence of control, Abe’s handling of
historical issues has been very negatively received by the expert community and,
as a result, academic debates on Japan have tended to narrow around fears of a
resurgent Japanese militarism.42 Second, Japan is China’s second most important
bilateral relationship, lending itself to a monopolization of decision making at the
(accessed 26 November 2014); Jia Xiudong, ‘‘riben cheng de bu shi baohusan, ershi yexin,’’ Renmin
Ribao Overseas Edition, 14 July 2014, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2014-07/14/con-
tent_1452436.htm (accessed 24 November 2014).
40. See, for example, Wu Jinan, ‘‘riben anquan zhengce quanbian de liyou shi xujia de,’’ Xinmin
Wanbao, 15 August 2014, http://xmwb.xinmin.cn/resfile/2014-08-15/B04/B04.pdf (accessed 25
November 2014).
41. See Lian Degui, ‘‘riben xianfa cheng le huaping,’’ Jiefang Ribao, 5 July 2014, http://newspaper.
jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2014-07/05/content_1175992.htm (accessed 26 November 2014); Wu Jinan,
‘‘riben anquan.’’
42. King, ‘‘Where does Japan fit?’’
Abb and Koellner 609
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on November 20, 2015ijx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
top and fewer opportunities for think tanks to exercise inﬂuence. Third, the vast
majority of Chinese citizens already hold strong (negative) views about Japan and
its current government due to Abe’s treatment of historical issues,43 which also
makes it harder for experts to exercise inﬂuence over public opinion.
These caveats notwithstanding, the example very much showcases an emerging
task of Chinese FPTTs: they are increasingly engaged in a public role, providing
background information on current events not only to policy elites but also the
interested public. Their duties serve both as a way of circumventing the often
ineﬃcient internal advice channels and also an opportunity to shape public opinion
in a way that is conducive to China’s own strategic aims, for whose pursuit popular
nationalism is as much of a hindrance as an asset.44
The latter function—a variant of ‘‘manufacturing consent’’—is, of course, a
direct consequence of the think tanks’ tight integration with government structures,
and reﬂects the current arrangement between the leadership and its experts: essen-
tially, their joint project is to manage China’s rise and to see their state restored to a
position of regional leadership, while also tackling the problems that this shift is
causing with other states. Under these circumstances, it is not likely that any
Chinese FPTT or its staﬀers will publicly criticize the government and lobby for
policy changes, as Western institutes often do. Rather, the think tanks will continue
to work in close coordination with government authorities, and strive to maintain
China’s CCP-led political order by providing it with expertise and public support.
Conclusions
Foreign policy think tanks in Japan and China share many aims and ambitions.
Both seek to inform and, ideally, also aﬀect public discourses as well as decision
making on foreign and security policies—be it by issuing policy briefs, by providing
commentaries in the media, or by serving as platforms for the exchange of views
with representatives from other states. Foreign policy think tanks in both countries
aim to convey relevant standpoints and perspectives to international audiences
and, ultimately, also to contribute to their respective countries’ involvement and
standing in international aﬀairs. They have been embraced by their peers in North
America and elsewhere, who seek insights into current foreign and security policy
thinking in these two countries.
Similarities between many FPTTs in China and Japan also include their strong
ties to individual ministries and government agencies—though at least some
Japanese think tanks seek to transcend such links and the resulting obligations.
Given the problem of bureaucratic stovepiping in both countries, think tanks can
help to inform or even facilitate policy-making by providing additional perspectives
43. See Pew Research, ‘‘Global Attitudes Report. Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other,’’ 14 July
2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/ (accessed 9
December 2014).
44. See Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 219–222.
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and, at least in the Japanese case, by participating in governmental advisory
boards, which in turn can be used by political leaders to bridge organizational
divides and to set policy directions.
However, while many FPTTs in China have received increased funding and con-
sequently improved the academic qualiﬁcations of their staﬀers in recent years, many
Japanese FPTTs continue to struggle in terms of funding and personnel. Also mir-
roring China’s rise in international politics and economic aﬀairs and Japan’s relative
decline in these spheres, China’s FPTTs have become more visible and vocal on the
global stage while their Japanese counterparts, few in number and also often under-
staﬀed, are having a more diﬃcult time getting their messages across.
Notably, FPTTs in both Japan and China have yet to serve as genuine agenda
setters for their two countries’ foreign and policy security policy. Far more often
they play a reactive role, for example, by helping to legitimize existing policy pref-
erences and positions. This does not mean that FPTTs merely serve as mouthpieces
of political leaders in both countries—in many cases think tank scholars in China
and Japan share the world views of their political leaders and thus act out of
conviction. The recent involvement of think tankers in the Japanese government’s
advisory panel, which helped to legitimize the Cabinet’s reinterpretation of the
constitution to allow for collective self-defence, serves as a case in point. While
Chinese FPTTs’ reactions to the reinterpretation were predictably harsh and
remained close to the oﬃcial foreign ministry line, they were also nuanced in
that they distinguished between the intentions of Japan’s political leaders and
the views of many ordinary Japanese. This reﬂects their establishment status and
resulting desire to keep Sino-Japanese relations on an even keel.
Given that many of the existing FPTTs in Japan and China have in the past
played useful roles in terms of operating bilateral dialogue forums, they are also
well positioned to contribute to current and future Sino-Japanese exchanges among
politicians and opinion leaders. Venues like the annual Beijing-Tokyo Forum bring
think tankers, oﬃcials, and business leaders from both states together and can
serve as a conduit for exchanges even in times when relations between top leaders
are acrimonious.45 These days such exchanges are all the more valuable and timely
as many veterans knowledgeable about the other country have left the scene in
recent years, leading to a palpable drying up of ‘‘human pipelines’’ between China
and Japan. While one should not expect miracles from such bilateral ‘‘track two’’
or ‘‘1.5’’ dialogues, constrained as they are by the currently prevailing mistrust on
both sides, it stands to reason that without such activities, the danger of unintended
collisions between East Asia’s two giants might well be greater.
45. ‘‘10th Beijing-Tokyo Forum held in Japan,’’ China Military Online, 29 September 2014, http://
eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-09/29/content_6160355.htm
(accessed 16 December 2014).
Abb and Koellner 611
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on November 20, 2015ijx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Funding
This research received no speciﬁc grant from any funding agency in the public,
commercial, or not-for-proﬁt sectors.
Author Biographies
Pascal Abb received his PhD in political science from the University of Hamburg
and is currently a research fellow at the Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German
Institute of Global and Area Studies, and a visiting scholar at the Institute of
International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taipei. His research
focuses on China’s foreign policy toward its regional environment and the role of
think tanks in China’s political system.
Patrick Koellner is the director of the Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German
Institute of Global and Area Studies, and a professor of political science at the
University of Hamburg. His research revolves around political organizations and
institutions in East Asia and Australasia.
612 International Journal 70(4)
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on November 20, 2015ijx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
